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THE PROMISE TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS NOT UNCONDITIONAL BUT RATHER THE DEFENDANT’S HAVING AVAILABLE CASH TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT HAD AVAILABLE CASH, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that summary judgment should not have been awarded to the plaintiff (Related) in this breach of contract action. The agreement provided that loan payments be made to plaintiff by the defendant (Tesla) from available cash. The existence of available cash was deemed a condition precedent. Because plaintiff could not show defendant had available case, summary judgment was not an available remedy:

A condition precedent is “an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a promise in the agreement arises” … . The term sheet does not contain an unconditional promise by Tesla to repay the cash advances, distinguishing the transactions from the typical loan arrangement, which involves an unconditional promise to repay the amount advanced. Rather, pursuant to the waterfall provision, Tesla was to repay the cash advances from cash that was available for distribution after the payment of taxes. Related failed to establish that this condition precedent was satisfied, and its motion for summary judgment should have therefore been denied once the court determined that Tesla presently had no “available cash” to repay Related … . Related Cos., L.P. v Tesla Wall Sys., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02122, First Dept 3-27-18

CONTRACT LAW (CONDITION PRECEDENT, THE PROMISE TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS NOT UNCONDITIONAL BUT RATHER THE DEFENDANT’S HAVING AVAILABLE CASH TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT HAD AVAILABLE CASH, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/CONDITION PRECEDENT (CONTRACT LAW, THE PROMISE TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS NOT UNCONDITIONAL BUT RATHER THE DEFENDANT’S HAVING AVAILABLE CASH TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT HAD AVAILABLE CASH, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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