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REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in his action against the rear-most driver (Lipome) which struck a stopped car (Foley’s car) causing chain-reaction collisions. Plaintiff was subsequently struck by another car (driven by Hourt) after he got out of his car to check on the other drivers. The rear-most driver who caused the chain-reaction accident (Lipome) was not liable for the subsequent accident (when plaintiff was on foot and struck by Hourt):

” [T]he rearmost driver in a chain-reaction collision bears a presumption of responsibility’ ” … , and “[i]t is well established that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, [nonnegligent] explanation for the accident”… . Here, plaintiff met his initial burden of demonstrating that Lipome was negligent in rear-ending Foley’s vehicle, which undisputedly caused the chain-reaction accident. Lipome has not provided any nonnegligent explanation for the collision and, indeed, it appears from the record that Lipome essentially admitted that she was at fault for rear-ending Foley’s vehicle. …

We agree with Lipome, however, that she is entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her insofar as it relates to the accident between plaintiff and Hourt, and we therefore further modify the order accordingly. Lipome’s negligence in the chain-reaction accident “did nothing more than to furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which [plaintiff’s] injury was made possible and which was brought about by the intervention of a new, independent and efficient cause” … , i.e., plaintiff’s conduct in walking back to the accident scene. Prior to plaintiff’s accident with Hourt, the situation resulting from the initial rear-end accident ” was a static, completed occurrence,’ . . . [and] [t]he risk undertaken by plaintiff’ [in walking back to the rear-end accident scene] was created by himself” … . Gustke v Nickerson, 2018 NY Slip Op 02087, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS  (REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENTS  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/FURNISH CONDITION FOR ACCIDENT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))

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