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NOTICE OF INTENTION INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC ABOUT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ALLEGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined sexual harassment and employment discrimination claims against a former NYS Assemblyman were properly dismissed because the notice of intent were insufficiently specific:

… [T]he statute requires that a “claim shall state the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, [and] the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained[,] . . . [and a] notice of intention to file a claim shall set forth the same matters” (Court of Claims Act§ 11 [b]). “With regard to the requisite specificity as to the place where the claim arose, we note that [w]hat is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable [defendant] to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances” … . Here, the relevant notice of intention did not set forth … the place where any of the alleged misconduct occurred … . We reject claimants’ contention that the claims … should not have been dismissed because the alleged misconduct occurred wherever they were working at any particular time and defendant could easily ascertain such information from its records. “The Court of Claims Act does not require [defendant] to ferret out or assemble information that section 11 (b) obligates the claimant to allege” … . Snickles v State of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 02042, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

COURT OF CLAIMS (NOTICE OF INTENTION INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC ABOUT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ALLEGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/NOTICES OF INTENTION (COURT OF CLAIMS, NOTICE OF INTENTION INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC ABOUT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ALLEGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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