You are here: / / CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER...

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court should not have determined defendant (Rose Associates) was not a statutory agent of the owner in this Labor Law 240 (1) and 24 1 (6) action, explaining the correct criteria. In addition Supreme Court should not have denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, which was based upon the allegation the ladder plaintiff was on moved:

The motion court erred in determining that Rose Associates is not an agent of defendant owner Continental Towers Condominium. Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) impose absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for a statutory violation resulting in injury, regardless of whether they directed or controlled the work … . Thus…  the test of whether a defendant is a statutory agent subject to liability under those sections is not whether it actually supervised the work, but whether it had the authority to do so … . …

… [T]he court should have granted plaintiff’s cross motion, as the evidence establishes that plaintiff slipped or fell from an unsecured ladder upon which he was working because it moved … . The testimony of plaintiff’s coworker that plaintiff stated he slipped was “not inconsistent with plaintiff’s version that he slipped after the ladder moved” … . Moreover, defendants’ expert affidavits asserting that no force acted upon the ladder that could have caused it to move were speculative. Merino v Continental Towers Condominium, 2018 NY Slip Op 01549, First Dept 3-8-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
PETITIONER NYC FIREFIGHTER WAS DENIED ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT (ADR) BENEFITS WITHOUT ANY EXPLANATION IN THE MEDICAL BOARD’S FINDINGS; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A NEW DETERMINATION BASED ON A RECORD ADEQUATE FOR REVIEW (FIRST DEPT).
FOIL REQUEST FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS BUREAU (TVB) RECORDS RELEVANT TO A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
THE EXISTENCE OF A HANDRAIL ON THE LEFT OF THE STAIRS DID NOT WARRANT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WHERE THERE WAS NO HANDRAIL ON THE RIGHT (FIRST DEPT).
From the Point When a Director’s Position Becomes Adverse to the Corporation, the Director Is Not Entitled to Discovery of the Corporation’s Attorney-Client Communications
PLAINTIFF WAS STANDING ON AN A-FRAME LADDER WHEN A CEILING TILE DROPPED, THE LADDER WIGGLED, AND PLAINTIFF FELL; PLANTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; THE LADDER WAS NOT AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN AND FAILED TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN (FIRST DEPT). ​
IN A COMPLEX PATERNITY CASE SPANNING EIGHT YEARS ORDER PRECLUDING CHILD FROM ESTABLISHING ESTOPPEL AND FINDING PETITIONER HAD STANDING TO SEEK CUSTODY AND VISITATION PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
THE FEDERAL CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY CRIME OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED WAS BASED ON CONDUCT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN CRIMINALIZED BY A NEW YORK STATUTE AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION; THEREFORE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED A SEX OFFENDER UNDER SORA (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVIDENCE PETITIONER HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA WHERE THE CONTRABAND WAS FOUND WAS... PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE...