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EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND DEFENDANT’S TRUCK CROSSED INTO HIS PATH, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this truck-bicycle accident case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff had the right of way and defendant crossed into plaintiff’s path, there was a question of fact whether plaintiff could have avoided the accident:

Plaintiff, while traveling south on a bicycle, collided with the passenger side of defendants’ northbound truck as it turned left across his path. While the record establishes that plaintiff had the right of way, an issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff was negligent in that he could have avoided the collision through the exercise of reasonable care but failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability. Bermeo v Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., 2018 NY Slip Op 01433, First Dept 3-6-18

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND DEFENDANT’S TRUCK CROSSED INTO HIS PATH, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND DEFENDANT’S TRUCK CROSSED INTO HIS PATH, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT (FIRST DEPT))/BICYCLES (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND DEFENDANT’S TRUCK CROSSED INTO HIS PATH, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT (FIRST DEPT))

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