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TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS AGENCY IS A HYBRID AGENCY PLAYING BOTH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL ROLES, ALTHOUGH DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL ROLE ARE EXEMPT FROM FOIL DISCLOSURE, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTORIAL ROLE ARE NOT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department sent the matter back to Supreme Court to determine whether documents sought by petitioner under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) were exempt from disclosure. The documents (re: the photo speed monitoring system) are held by the Nassau Court Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (TPVA). Supreme Court found that the TPVA was exempt from as part of the judiciary. However, although part of the TPVA’s role is judicial, there are aspects of the agency which are prosecutorial. Supreme Court should have reviewed the documents to see whether the judiciary exemption applies to all the requested documents:

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FOIL applies to “agency” records, but its definition of “agency” expressly excludes the “judiciary” … . FOIL defines “judiciary” as “the courts of the state, including any municipal or district court, whether or not of record” … , the Court of Appeals stated that for purposes of jurisdiction over certain matters, the TPVA is “an arm of the District Court,” so that matters pending in the TPVA are considered to be pending in the District Court. Accordingly, it is indisputable that, at least for certain purposes, the TPVA is part of the judiciary. The Supreme Court erred, however, in holding that the TPVA is entirely judicial and thus not subject to FOIL at all. The Court of Appeals expressly recognized in Matter of Dolce v Nassau County Traffic & Parking Violations Agency that the TPVA is a “hybrid agency that exercises both prosecutorial and adjudicatory responsibilities,” and that the prosecutorial function is “distinct from the adjudicatory function” (id. at 498). Accordingly, to the extent that a TPVA record concerns the nonadjudicatory responsibilities of the TPVA, it is not exempt from disclosure under the definition of “agency” in Public Officers Law § 86(3). Without examination of the records that the petitioner seeks, the Supreme Court cannot make a determination as to whether they are exempt from disclosure as records of the “judiciary” … . Matter of Law Offs. of Cory H. Morris v County of Nassau, 2018 NY Slip Op 00835, Second Dept 2-7-18

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS AGENCY IS A HYBRID AGENCY PLAYING BOTH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL ROLES, ALTHOUGH DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL ROLE ARE EXEMPT FROM FOIL, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTORIAL ROLE ARE NOT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS AGENCY (FOIL, TRAFFIC AND PARKING VIOLATIONS AGENCY IS A HYBRID AGENCY PLAYING BOTH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL ROLES, ALTHOUGH DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL ROLE ARE EXEMPT FROM FOIL, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTORIAL ROLE ARE NOT (SECOND DEPT))

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