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STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the findings of the NYS Division of Human Rights (SDHR) in this sex discrimination action should not be disturbed. The SDHR found that petitioner was not subjected to a hostile work environment and was not constructively discharged because of her sex. The Second Department explained the court’s limited review power in this context:

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The scope of judicial review under the Human Rights Law is extremely narrow and is confined to the consideration of whether the determination of the SDHR is supported by substantial evidence in the record… . Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact . . . More than seeming or imaginary, it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” … .. “Courts may not weigh the evidence or reject [the SDHR’s] determination where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists” … . Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s determination that the petitioner was not subjected to a hostile work environment or constructively discharged because of her sex … . Matter of Leippe v Gerald J. Wilkoff, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00294, Second Dept 1-17-18

EMPLOYMENT LAW (STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  (STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SUBJECT TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF HER SEX SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, LIMITED COURT REVIEW POWERS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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