You are here: / / JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO A LESSER OFFENSE WITHOUT...
,

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO A LESSER OFFENSE WITHOUT THE PROSECUTOR’S PERMISSION, HOWEVER NEITHER A WRIT OF PROHIBITION NOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS WAS WARRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the writ of prohibition against a judge for accepting a plea to a lesser offense without the prosecutor’s permission was not warranted because the judge (the respondent) acknowledged the mistake. The court further determined it did not have the authority to grant the writ of mandamus, seeking vacation of the plea and reinstatement of the more serious charge, because the plea had already been entered and the conditional discharge sentence had been commenced:

​

Under CPL 220.10 (3), “the defendant may, with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people, enter a plea of guilty of a lesser included offense.” “Where the record shows that the prosecutor’s consent to a plea is premised on a negotiated sentence and a lesser sentence is later deemed more appropriate, the People should be given the opportunity to withdraw their consent” … . Respondent concedes in his brief that he committed a legal error in accepting Hernandez’s plea to a reduced charge without petitioner’s consent. The question therefore distills to whether a writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus is warranted given that Hernandez’s guilty plea has already been accepted, she was already sentenced by respondent to, among other things, a one-year conditional discharge period and such period expired in November 2017.

“[T]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition is only available where a body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is a clear legal right to such relief” … . Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prohibit respondent from accepting guilty pleas to reduced charges in the future without his consent. Respondent, however, noted at the sentencing hearing that this was the first time that he had ever reduced a charge without petitioner’s consent and that he did so “under the circumstances of [the] case.” Given that the record does not indicate that respondent has undertaken such similar action in the past or has expressed an intention to do so in the future, and taking into account respondent’s concession that his actions were erroneous, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition … . Matter of Carnright v Williams, 2018 NY Slip Op 00206, Third Dept 1-11-18

You might also like
NEITHER THE “HABIT” NOR THE “ERROR IN JUDGMENT” JURY INSTRUCTION WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Court Should Not Have Precluded Expert Evidence About the Quality of Representation Received by Indigent Defendants
Effects of Refusal to Allow Inmate to Call Witness Explained
THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CLAIMANT’S ATTORNEY AND THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINER DID NOT CREATE THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY, THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINER’S REPORT AND TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED (THIRD DEPT).
Doctrine of “Practical Location” (to Determine Boundary Line) Explained
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA; DEFENDANT WAS TOLD BY DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT DEPORTATION BASED ON THE PLEA WAS POSSIBLE, BUT HE WAS NOT TOLD IT WAS MANDATORY; DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE MAY HAVE DECIDED TO GO TO TRIAL IF HE HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE MANDATORY DEPORTATION (THIRD DEPT).
FOR PURPOSES OF A PERMANENT NEGLECT/TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING, DIRECT PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD WITH A SUITABLE PERSON MEETS THE DEFINITION OF PLACEMENT IN THE “CARE OF AN AUTHORIZED AGENCY” SUCH THAT A PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDING IS AVAILABLE AFTER DIRECT PLACEMENT FOR ONE YEAR; ALTHOUGH RESPONDENT’S PARENTAL RIGHTS HAD BEEN TERMINATED WHEN THIS APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED, THE “EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE” WAS INVOKED (THIRD DEPT).
WIFE’S STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF AN ANNUITY PAID TO THE HUSBAND WAS REVOKED BY OPERATION OF THE ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUST LAW (EPTL) UPON DIVORCE (THIRD DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S... APPEAL OF SORA RISK ASSESSMENT NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION, COUNTY...