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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS INTERSECTION COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER DID NOT STOP AT A STOP SIGN, ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE INSUFFICIENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant's (Bishop's) motion for summary judgment should have been granted in this intersection traffic accident case. The driver of the car in which plaintiff was a passenger (Pulinario) failed to stop at a stop sign. No question of fact was raised about Bishop's comparative negligence:

Bishop met her prima facie burden for summary judgment by demonstrating that Pulinario was negligent as a matter of law, and that Bishop was not negligently operating her vehicle. Bishop and plaintiff testified that Pulinario failed to stop for a stop sign, which is a violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law §§ 1142(a) and 1172(a), which constitutes negligence as a matter of law… . Bishop, who had the right of way, was ” entitled to anticipate that other vehicles will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield,' and ha[d] no duty to watch for and avoid a driver who might fail to stop . . . at a stop sign'” … .

Although a driver lawfully entering an intersection may still be found partially at fault for an accident if he or she fails to use reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle in the intersection … , plaintiff and Pulinario failed to raise a triable material issue of fact as to whether Bishop was negligent. The evasive measures that Bishop took during the less than three seconds before impact did not constitute negligence, “under the emergency-like circumstances confronting her” … . Gonzalez v Bishop, 2018 NY Slip Op 00095, First Dept 1-9-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS INTERSECTION COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER DID NOT STOP AT A STOP SIGN, ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE INSUFFICIENT (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS INTERSECTION COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER DID NOT STOP AT A STOP SIGN, ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE INSUFFICIENT (FIRST DEPT))

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THE TERMS ‘EVENT OF DEFAULT’ AND ‘DEFAULT’ WHICH APPEARED IN TWO DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE DEEMED TO MEAN THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THE TERMS WERE DEEMED SYNONYMOUS PLAINTIFF DID NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR STANDING TO SUE, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE RELIANCE UPON THE INFLATED RENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FILED REGISTRATION STATEMENTS; THEREFORE THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
THE LLC’S FAILURE TO CHANGE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR A DEFAULT; PARTIES TO WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS TRANSFERRED AFTER THE LIS PENDENS WAS FILED ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE BOUND BY THE RESULT IN THIS ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS, FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
THE ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO SEEK A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR DID NOT INLCUDE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF A PATTERN OF DELAY; THEREFORE THE “FAILURE TO PROSECUTE” EXCEPTION IN CPLR 205 (A) DID NOT APPLY; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION BROUGHT WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).
EVEN WHERE, AS HERE, THE REVIEWING COURT WOULD HAVE DECIDED THE MATTER DIFFERENTLY, THE COURT MUST AFFIRM AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY’S RULING WHICH HAS A RATIONAL BASIS; THE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE PROOF PETITIONER RESIDED WITH HIS BROTHER IN THE MITCHELL-LAMA APARTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT AND PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO SUCCESSION RIGHTS (FIRST DEPT).
FAMILY COURT DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED “SEARCHING INQUIRY” RE: WHETHER FATHER WAS KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL (FIRST DEPT). ​
Defendant Entitled to Suppression Hearing Where People Provided No Information About How Defendant Came to the Attention of Law Enforcement Personnel

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