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ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiffs' causes of action for trespass and encroachment properly survived summary judgment and the cause of action for enforcement of a restrictive covenant was properly dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that construction on defendants' building encroached on and damaged a party wall. The restrictive covenant was in an 1869 deed and did not indicate it was for the benefit of anyone other than the grantee:

The motion court correctly denied the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of the causes of action for encroachment and trespass. “A party wall is for the common benefit of contiguous proprietors. Neither may subject it to a use whereby it ceases to be continuously available for enjoyment by the other. . . A wall may be carried by either owner beyond its height as first erected, provided only it is strong enough to bear the weight and strain” … . It was defendants' burden, as movants, to offer evidence establishing their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment … . This they have failed to do. Indeed, plaintiffs in opposition proffer evidence that the alterations to the party wall have undermined the structural integrity of their buildings. Plaintiffs' engineer opined that defendants failed to detail a flashing system and to adhere to industry standards, occasioning damage. He further opined that it was impossible to ascertain whether the new masonry is properly tied to the old masonry so as to provide the requisite structural stability.

The cause of action to enforce a restrictive covenant was correctly dismissed for lack of standing…  The covenant was entered into in 1869 by the original owner of one lot that included both of the subject properties and his immediate neighbor, and it contains no explicit provision that it is for the benefit of anyone other than the grantee. Mastrobattista v Borges, 2018 NY Slip Op 00039, First Depat 1-2-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))/TRESPASS  (ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))/ENCROACHMENT (ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))/DEEDS  (ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))/RESTRICTIVE COVENANT (DEEDS, ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))/PARTY WALLS (ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS AND ENCROACHMENT ALLEGING DAMAGE TO A PARTY WALL PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN 1869 DEED DID NOT BENEFIT ANYONE OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE (FIRST DEPT))

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