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THREE-FOOT HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL IN ROOF LEVELS WAS NOT THE TYPE OF ELEVATION HAZARD CONTEMPLATED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the three-foot height differential between roof levels did not present the type of elevation hazard contemplated by Labor Law 249 (1). Plaintiff climbed to the higher level to retrieve a ladder and fell off when his foot slipped on the edge of the higher level:

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The plaintiff and his coworker climbed to this higher level of the roof without using any equipment. When the plaintiff attempted to descend to the lower level of the roof, his right foot slipped on the lip of the upper level, and he fell onto the lower level. …

The defendants established … that Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply because the three-foot- height differential between the two levels of the roof did not present the sort of elevation-related risk protected by that statute … . Pita v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 08869, Second Dept 12-20-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (THREE-FOOT HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL IN ROOF LEVELS WAS NOT THE TYPE OF ELEVATION HAZARD CONTEMPLATED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT))/ELEVATION RELATED RISK (LABOR LAW 240 (1), THREE-FOOT HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL IN ROOF LEVELS WAS NOT THE TYPE OF ELEVATION HAZARD CONTEMPLATED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT))

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