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You are here: Home1 / Administrative Law2 / HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CONSTITUTE...
Administrative Law, Evidence

HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CONSTITUTE THE SOLE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in upholding a fine imposed upon a bar by the NYS Liquor Authority relating to an altercation, the court explained the use of hearsay in an administrative proceeding:

​

“Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law, and at which evidence was taken, is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence” … . Substantial evidence has been defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … . It is “[m]ore than seeming or imaginary, it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” … . ” The standard demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable'” … . The strict rules of evidence do not apply to administrative proceedings and hearsay evidence is admissible… . Hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence if sufficiently relevant and probative and may, under appropriate circumstances, form the sole basis for an agency’s determination, unless it is seriously controverted … . Matter of Bracco’s Clam & Oyster Bar, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 08516, Second Dept 12-6-17

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (HEARSAY, HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CONSTITUTE THE SOLE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CONSTITUTE THE SOLE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, HEARSAY IS ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND MAY CONSTITUTE THE SOLE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT))

December 6, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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