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STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the child support provisions of a stipulation complied with the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) and were enforceable. The Third Department further found that the proper standard for an upward modification of support was that which was agreed to in the stipulation:

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The stipulation, as well as the order of support, recite that the parties had been advised of and fully understood the child support provisions of the CSSA and that the application of the statute would result in the presumptively correct amount of child support to be awarded. The stipulation then sets forth the presumptive amount of child support that would be awarded under the CSSA and the agreed-upon figures used to calculate that amount, states that the parties are deviating from the presumptive amount and provides a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation therefrom. Thus, the opt out provisions of the stipulation fully comply with the CSSA … . That the judgment of divorce does not explicitly set forth the CSSA recitals is not determinative, as the statute only requires the inclusion of such recitals in the “agreement or stipulation . . . presented to the court for incorporation in an order or judgment” … .

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Generally, a party seeking modification of a child support provision derived from an agreement or stipulation incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce has the burden of proving, insofar as is relevant here, “that an unanticipated and unreasonable change of circumstances has occurred resulting in a concomitant increased need or that the needs of the children are not being adequately met”… . “The parties are free, however, to agree to different terms triggering a change in the obligations of the payor spouse, including the application of a standard other than substantial unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances as the basis for determining a modification application, provided that . . . the children’s personal right to receive adequate support is not adversely affected and public policy is not offended” … . Here, the parties’ 1999 stipulation expressly provides that either party may petition a court for a modification of child support based upon “a change of circumstances.” Through this clear and unqualified language, the parties plainly expressed an intent to dispense with the “unanticipated and unreasonable change of circumstances” standard in favor of a less burdensome “change of circumstances” standard … . Matter of Frederick-Kane v Potter, 2017 NY Slip Op 08219, Third Dept 11-22-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CHILD SUPPORT, STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT))/CHILD SUPPORT (FAMILY LAW, STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, STIPULATION, CHILD SUPPORT, STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT))/STIPULATION (FAMILY LAW, CHILD SUPPORT, STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT))/UPWARD MODIFICATION (FAMILY LAW, CHILD SUPPORT, , STIPULATION COMPLIED WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT AND STATED THE PROPER STANDARD FOR AN UPWARD MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT (THIRD DEPT))

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