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CONTRACT NOT ACTIONABLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT SPELL OUT THE CONSIDERATION FOR A PAST OR EXECUTED PROMISE, DECISION ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT BECOME THE LAW OF THE CASE IN A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a contract was not actionable because the consideration for a past or executed promise was not spelled out in it. The court noted that a decision on a motion to dismiss does not become the law of the case in a subsequent motion for summary judgment:

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General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-1105 provides:

“A promise in writing and signed by the promisor or by his agent shall not be denied effect as a valid contractual obligation on the ground that consideration for the promise is past or executed, if the consideration is expressed in the writing and is proved to have been given or performed and would be a valid consideration but for the time when it was given or performed.”

It essentially codifies the notion that “[g]enerally, past consideration is no consideration and cannot support an agreement because the detriment did not induce the promise.’ That is, since the detriment had already been incurred, it cannot be said to have been bargained for in exchange for the promise'”… . However, General Obligations Law § 5-1105 makes an exception where the past consideration is explicitly recited in a writing. To qualify for the exception, the description of the consideration must not be “vague” or “imprecise,” nor may extrinsic evidence be employed to assist in understanding the consideration … . * * *

… “[T]he law of the case doctrine does not apply when a motion to dismiss is followed by a summary judgment motion” … . Korff v Corbett, 2017 NY Slip Op 07677, First Dept 11-2-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (CONTRACT NOT ACTIONABLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT SPELL OUT THE CONSIDERATION FOR A PAST OR EXECUTED PROMISE, DECISION ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT BECOME THE LAW OF THE CASE IN A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECISION ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT BECOME THE LAW OF THE CASE IN A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 5-1105  (CONTRACT NOT ACTIONABLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT SPELL OUT THE CONSIDERATION FOR A PAST OR EXECUTED PROMISE, DECISION ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT BECOME THE LAW OF THE CASE IN A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/CONSIDERATION (CONTRACT LAW, CONTRACT NOT ACTIONABLE BECAUSE IT DID NOT SPELL OUT THE CONSIDERATION FOR A PAST OR EXECUTED PROMISE, DECISION ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT BECOME THE LAW OF THE CASE IN A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))

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