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WINNING A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT TRIGGER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER CPLR 3220 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the successful motion to dismiss a civil suit did not mandate the award of attorney’s fees under the CPLR:

… “[U]nder the American Rule as applied to statutory entitlement to attorneys’ fees, the [United States] Supreme Court has held that we follow a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority”… . * * *

The relevant phrase of CPLR 3220 stating that the claimant “shall pay the expenses necessarily incurred by the party against whom the claim is asserted, for trying the issue of damages from the time of the offer” demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that, where the claimant has not accepted the offer, the commencement of a trial is a condition precedent to imposing liability upon the claimant for the opposing party’s expenses. This phrase also defines the recoverable expenses as those “necessarily” expended “for trying the issue of damages.” CPLR 3220 further provides that those expenses should be determined by the judge “before whom the case is tried.” Accordingly, the plain language of CPLR 3220 does not explicitly authorize an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a party … who merely prevailed in seeking dismissal of a cause of action alleging breach of contract. Even if CPLR 3220 could arguably support an implied right to the attorney’s fees and costs … , the public policy of the American Rule militates against adoption of that interpretation … . Saul v Cahan, 2017 NY Slip Op 06391, Second Dept 8-30-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (WINNING A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT TRIGGER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER CPLR 3220 (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FEES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, WINNING A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT TRIGGER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER CPLR 3220 (SECOND DEPT))

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