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ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined a release plaintiff’s decedent (South) agreed to in 1997 did not preclude the instant suit. South alleged he had been exposed to asbestos made by Texaco on board ships during his long career in the Merchant Marine. South died of mesothelioma. The 1997 release mentioned mesothelioma as a possible result of asbestos exposure but the First Department determined it was not clear South knew he was suffering from mesothemiola at the time he signed the release (in return for $1750.00). The case was analyzed under federal admiralty law law (Jones Act):

… [W]e find that the release does not pass muster. To tease out the true intent South had when he signed the release, it is necessary to consider the context in which he did so. The 1997 complaint, while making generalized allegations that South had been exposed to asbestos, is exceedingly vague as to whether he had actually contracted an asbestos-related disease. To be sure, it mentions a “devastating pulmonary disease Plaintiff now suffers” and an exhaustive grab-bag of asbestos-related diseases, from asbestosis to mesothelioma to brain cancer. However, it is impossible to conclude from the complaint that South had actually received a diagnosis. Indeed, the “meager” consideration he received for resolving the claim suggests that he had not been diagnosed with an asbestos-related disease, much less one even approaching the severity of the mesothelioma that the complaint specifically alleges he had. The complaint leaves open that possibility, to the extent it seeks relief for fear of an asbestos-related disease and not for the disease itself. Accordingly, the risk of contracting an actual asbestos-related disease remained hypothetical to South, and we decline to read the release as if South understood the implications of such a disease but chose nonetheless to release Texaco from claims arising from it.

Further, if South had not received a definitive diagnosis at the time the 1997 complaint was filed, then the release, to the extent it warns him of the possibility of “a new and different diagnosis from the diagnosis as of the date of this Release,” does not reflect the actual circumstances known to him, since the words “new” and “different” suggest that South had already been diagnosed with a disease when he executed the release. Rather, the lack of an actual diagnosis reveals the language in the release as mere boilerplate, and not the result of an agreement the parameters of which had been specifically negotiated and understood by South. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2017 NY Slip Op 06343  First Dept 8-29-17

CONTRACT LAW (RELEASES, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (ASBESTOS, RELEASES, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))/TOXIC TORTS (ASBESTOS, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))/ASBESTOS (TOXIC TORTS, RELEASES, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))/ASBESTOS (TOXIC TORTS, RELEASES, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))/MESOPTHEMIOLA (ASBESTOS, RELEASES, ALTHOUGH THE ASBESTOS LIABILITY RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 MENTIONED MESOTHEMIOLA, THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE WAS DEEMED TO BE BOILERPLATE WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE THE INSTANT SUIT ALLEGING DEATH FROM MESOTHEMIOLA (FIRST DEPT))

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FOR CAUSE FORFEITURE TERM OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT NOT ELIMINATED... DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED...