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LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s (OneWest’s) motion to vacate a default judgment dismissing the complaint should not have been granted. One West’s attorney did not show up for a scheduled settlement conference:

OneWest moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order entered upon its default in appearing at the conferences and to restore the action to the active calendar. In support of its motion, OneWest alleged that it was unaware of the scheduled conferences “due to law office confusion” following the substitution of counsel. The Supreme Court granted the motion. [Defendant] appeals.

A plaintiff seeking to vacate a default in appearing at a conference is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for its default and a potentially meritorious cause of action… . Although “[a] motion to vacate a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court” … , the defaulting party must submit evidence in admissible form establishing both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious cause of action or defense … .

A court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse for a party’s default … . However, “it was not the Legislature’s intent to routinely excuse such defaults” … , and mere neglect is not a reasonable excuse… .

Contrary to OneWest’s contention, it failed to provide a detailed and credible explanation of the default… . Rather, counsel’s affirmation in support of the motion contained only the conclusory and undetailed allegation of “law office confusion” after being substituted as counsel for OneWest, which does not constitute a reasonable excuse… . No other evidence was submitted to corroborate the allegation. OneWest, therefore, failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default … . OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer, 2017 NY Slip Op 06184, Second Dept 8-16-17

 

FORECLOSURE (LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FORECLOSURE, LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT))/SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE LAW OFFICE CONFUSION NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BANK ATTORNEY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT))(FORECLOSURE)

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