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FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A SWORN JUROR, AN ATTORNEY, WHOSE FIRM REPRESENTED THE MURDER VICTIM’S PARENTS IN AN ACTION TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT’S AND VICTIM’S CHILD SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON IMPLIED BIAS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a dissent, determined that defendant’s for cause challenge to a sworn juror should have been granted. Defendant was accused of killing his ex-wife, Powell. The juror was a partner in a law firm which represented Powell’s parents in their action to gain custody of Powell’s (and defendant’s) child.

… [W]here the challenging party acquires new information that had not been previously available after a juror has already been sworn, the trial court may entertain a challenge made for cause made before the first trial witness is sworn … . …

The governing law dictates that a juror should be discharged for cause where the juror is shown to have an implied bias; that is, if the juror shares a relationship with any person involved in the trial the nature of which is likely to preclude him or her from rendering an impartial verdict … .

… It bears noting that the juror did not personally represent Powell’s parents, and that the relationship shared by her firm and Powell’s family was purely of a professional nature. Nonetheless, the law firm owed Powell’s family a clear and paramount duty to represent their interests. As the juror recognized and stated in response to the court’s inquiry, the conflicts that arise therefrom — under the particular circumstances presented here — are imputed to her by law … . Further, the effect of the juror’s involvement cannot be said to be remote, as the verdict reached by this jury would inevitably affect the custody proceedings; indeed, by direct application of statutory law, a guilty verdict in this criminal action necessarily precluded an award of custody or visitation to defendant in that matter … .

As a matter of well-established law, a juror’s assurances of impartiality are inadequate to cure an implied bias … . People v Powell, 2017 NY Slip Op 06104, Third Dept 8-10-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JURORS, IMPLIED BIAS, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A SWORN JUROR, AND ATTORNEY,  WHOSE FIRM REPRESENTED THE MURDER VICTIM’S PARENTS IN AN ACTION TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT’S AND VICTIM’S CHILD SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON IMPLIED BIAS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT))/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A SWORN JUROR , AN ATTORNEY, WHOSE FIRM REPRESENTED THE MURDER VICTIM’S PARENTS IN AN ACTION TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT’S AND VICTIM’S CHILD SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON IMPLIED BIAS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (IMPLIED BIAS, CRIMINAL LAW, JURORS, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A SWORN JUROR, AN ATTORNEY, WHOSE FIRM REPRESENTED THE MURDER VICTIM’S PARENTS IN AN ACTION TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT’S AND VICTIM’S CHILD SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON IMPLIED BIAS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT))/IMPLIED BIAS (ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL LAW, JURORS, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A SWORN JUROR, AN ATTORNEY, WHOSE FIRM REPRESENTED THE MURDER VICTIM’S PARENTS IN AN ACTION TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT’S AND VICTIM’S CHILD SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED ON IMPLIED BIAS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT))

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