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ONE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION, THE OTHER DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE WORK, LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1), 241 (6) and 200 action should have been granted. The defendants are husband (Joel Mendlovits) and wife (Malka Mendloits). Malka owns the house where plaintiff was injured and was entitled to the homeowner’s exemption from liability under the Labor Law. Joel, who did not own the house, hired the company for which the injured plaintiff worked. Joel was entitled to summary judgment because he was not a contractor or agent within the meaning of the Labor Law, nor did he exercise and control over plaintiff’s work:

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Joel established that he did not possess the requisite authority to supervise or control the work being done to support liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). He hired All Care to perform stucco work on the home, but did not instruct All Care or the plaintiff how or when to do the work and did not provide them with any tools, materials, or safety equipment. The plaintiff received instructions on when, where, and how to perform the work from All Care and never spoke to Joel, who supervised the progress of the work only to the extent of making sure it was getting done. Such general supervision is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) or 241(6) … . …

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To be held liable pursuant to Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence where, as here, the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the methods or means of the work, “recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had . . . unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” … . Rodriguez v Mendlovits, 2017 NY Slip Op 05988, Second Dept 8-2-17

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LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ONE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION, THE OTHER DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE WORK, LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ONE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION, THE OTHER DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE WORK, LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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