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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should not have granted. Although plaintiff and defendant alleged defendant’s car was stopped behind  plaintiff’s car before defendant’s car was pushed into plaintiff’s car after defendant’s car was struck from behind by Vitale’s car, Vitale’s affidavit alleged defendant’s car collided with plaintiff’s car before Vitale collided with defendant. Therefore there was a question of fact whether defendant was comparatively negligent:

Here, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff driver and the defendant driver. The plaintiff driver testified at his deposition that the vehicle that he was operating had been stopped for a red traffic light for about 30 seconds when the defendants’ vehicle struck it in the rear. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff driver had observed the defendants’ vehicle stop behind his vehicle without touching it. The defendant driver attested that the vehicle that he was operating was stopped four feet behind the plaintiffs’ stopped vehicle when it was struck in the rear by Vitale’s vehicle. As a result, the defendants’ vehicle was propelled forward into the rear of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Under the circumstances, the defendants met their initial burden as the movants by demonstrating, prima facie, that their stopped vehicle was propelled forward into the plaintiffs’ vehicle after their vehicle was struck in the rear by a third vehicle, and that the defendant driver was not at fault in the happening of the accident … .

In opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs submitted, inter alia, Vitale’s affidavit. Vitale’s account of the accident differed from the parties’ account of the accident, and it raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants’ vehicle struck the plaintiffs’ vehicle before Vitale’s vehicle struck the defendants’ vehicle and whether the defendant driver was comparatively at fault … .Hasan Sharif Williams v Sala, 2017 NY Slip Op 05762, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-END COLLISIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-END COLLISIONS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/REAR-END COLLISIONS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)

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