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DEFECT WHICH CAUSED SLIP AND FALL WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants demonstrated the defective tile which caused plaintiff’s slip and fall constituted a trivial defect which was not actionable:

“A defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses. Only then does the burden shift to the plaintiff to establish an issue of fact” … . Here, the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion included photos of the alleged defective condition as identified by the plaintiff, a damaged piece of tile, as well as measurements placing the depression at the damaged tile to be, at most, one-eighth of an inch. These photographs, along with the plaintiff’s description of the time, place, and circumstance of the injury, established, prima facie, that the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law, and therefore, not actionable … . Kavanagh v Archdiocese of the City of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 05711, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, TRIVIAL DEFECT, DEFECT WHICH CAUSED SLIP AND FALL WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 2ND DEPT)/SLIP AND FALL (TRIVIAL DEFECT, DEFECT WHICH CAUSED SLIP AND FALL WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 2ND DEPT)/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SLIP AND FALL, DEFECT WHICH CAUSED SLIP AND FALL WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 2ND DEPT)

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