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CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A CITY EMT’S REFUSAL TO OFFER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESTAURANT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD COLLAPSED WHILE THE EMT WAS IN THE RESTAURANT 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department determined the city defendants did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff’s decedent (Rennix) despite the misconduct of a city employee. The city employee, an emergency medical technician (EMT) named Jackson, was in a restaurant when a restaurant employee collapsed. Because Jackson was not supposed to be on a break, she did not attempt to help plaintiff’s decedent, who died before the ambulance arrived. Rennix was pregnant and her baby also died. Because there was no special relationship between the city and plaintiff’s decedent, the city was not liable:

A municipal emergency response system is a governmental function, and thus where an emergency medical technician is alleged to have been negligent while acting in this governmental capacity, the municipality cannot be held liable unless it owed a “special duty” to the injured party … . There are three recognized situations in which a special duty may arise: “(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” … .

The plaintiffs contend that the first category applies to the circumstances here, and a special duty arose from Jackson’s violation of Penal Law § 195.00(2), which criminalizes official misconduct. * * *

Even assuming the plaintiffs could establish that Jackson was guilty of misconduct, the violation of Penal Law § 195.00(2) does not give rise to a special duty so as to impose tort liability. For a special duty to arise from the breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action … . A private right of action “may be fairly implied when (1) the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme”… .

Here, the plaintiffs’ claim fails at the first step of the analysis, as Rennix was not of a class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted. Rennix v Jackson, 2017 NY Slip Op 05471, 2nd Dept 7-5-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A CITY EMT’S REFUSAL TO OFFER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESTAURANT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD COLLAPSED WHILE THE EMT WAS IN THE RESTAURANT 2ND DEPT)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A CITY EMT’S REFUSAL TO OFFER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESTAURANT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD COLLAPSED WHILE THE EMT WAS IN THE RESTAURANT 2ND DEPT)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A CITY EMT’S REFUSAL TO OFFER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESTAURANT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD COLLAPSED WHILE THE EMT WAS IN THE RESTAURANT 2ND DEPT)/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A CITY EMT’S REFUSAL TO OFFER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A RESTAURANT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD COLLAPSED WHILE THE EMT WAS IN THE RESTAURANT 2ND DEPT)

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