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JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, reversing the appellate division, determined a juror who asked to be excused after four days of deliberations should have been discharged as “grossly unqualified.” The alternate jurors had been excused. The juror repeatedly told the judge she could not separate her emotions from her analysis of the facts. The defendant was charged with stabbing the victim 38 times:

Pursuant to CPL 270.35 (1), “[i]f at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . the court must discharge such juror. . . . If no alternate juror is available, the court must declare a mistrial.”

As explained in People v Buford, a juror is grossly unqualified “only ‘when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict'” (69 NY2d at 298 … ). * * *

…[ T]he record reveals that it was obvious the juror possessed a state of mind preventing her from rendering an impartial verdict and thus, she was “grossly unqualified to serve.” The juror declared forthrightly that she could not separate her emotions from her ability to deliberate and was incapable of fulfilling her sworn duty to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial and the law. Compelling the juror to resume deliberations could not cure the fundamental problem with her state of mind. The trial court’s implicit conclusion that the juror did not “possess[] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 298 …) was erroneous. People v Spencer, 2017 NY Slip Op 05118, CtApp 6-22-17

CRIMINAL LAW (JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)/JURORS (CRIMINAL, GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED, JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)/GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED (JURORS, CRIMINAL LAW, JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD NOT SEPARATE HER EMOTIONS FROM HER ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCUSED AS GROSSLY UNQUALIFIED)

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