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NON-USE ALONE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF AN EASEMENT, RPAPL 1951 CANNOT BE USED TO RETROACTIVELY EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT ON SOMEONE ELSE’S LAND.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs were not entitled to amend their pleadings to conform to the proof after a nonjury trial in this adverse possession proceeding. Plaintiffs sought adverse possession of portions “paper streets” on both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ (Hart’s) land arguing that any easement had been abandoned and should be extinguished pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1951. The court explained that non-use alone does not constitute abandonment and RPAPL 1951 cannot be used to retroactively extinguish an easement on someone else’s land:

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Because nonuse, as a matter of law, does not establish intent to abandon, and given that plaintiffs did not allege that the proof showed any other acts that would be cognizable in satisfying the requirement of “unequivocal [acts] . . . clearly demonstrat[ing] the owner[s’] intention to permanently relinquish all rights to [an] easement” … , plaintiffs’ proposed amendment regarding abandonment of any easement is palpably insufficient on its face … . …

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As the Court of Appeals has made clear, the Legislature intended for RPAPL 1951 (2) to make “available to owners of parcels burdened with outmoded restrictions an economical and efficient means of getting rid of them” … . As the Legislature intended for the provision to allow landowners to seek the extinguishment of restrictions on their property, the provision does not permit plaintiffs to extinguish an easement on Hart’s property. Moreover, the relevant inquiry for RPAPL 1951 focuses on “the time the enforceability of the restriction is brought in question” … . That time frame is a plain indication that any act by a court in extinguishing a restriction would not apply to a time prior to when the enforceability of the restriction was challenged. Therefore, as RPAPL 1951 (2) does not permit plaintiffs to retroactively extinguish an easement on Hart’s property, it is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim. Ferguson v Hart, 2017 NY Slip Op 04523, 3rd Dept 6-8-17

 

REAL PROPERTY (ADVERSE POSSESSION, EASEMENTS, NON-USE ALONE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF AN EASEMENT, RPAPL 1951 CANNOT BE USED TO RETROACTIVELY EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT ON SOMEONE ELSE’S LAND)/ADVERSE POSSESSION (EASEMENTS, NON-USE ALONE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF AN EASEMENT, RPAPL 1951 CANNOT BE USED TO RETROACTIVELY EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT ON SOMEONE ELSE’S LAND)ABANDONMENT (EASEMENTS,  NON-USE ALONE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF AN EASEMENT, RPAPL 1951 CANNOT BE USED TO RETROACTIVELY EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT ON SOMEONE ELSE’S LAND)/EXTINGUISHMENT (EASEMENTS, RPAPL 1951, ADVERSE POSSESSION, NON-USE ALONE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT OF AN EASEMENT, RPAPL 1951 CANNOT BE USED TO RETROACTIVELY EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT ON SOMEONE ELSE’S LAND)

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