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SCHOOL CUSTODIAN’S STATEMENT TO A TEACHER THAT ON THE DAY HE IS FIRED HE WILL COME IN AND ‘COLUMBINE THIS SHIT’ DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A TERRORISTIC THREAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PENAL LAW, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AFTER A READING OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS PROPER.

The Second Department determined defendant’s statement to a teacher that on the day he was fired from his school custodian job he would “Columbine this shit” was not legally sufficient evidence of a “terrorist threat” within the meaning of the Penal Law. The indictment was properly dismissed upon reading the grand jury minutes:

” In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt'”… . “The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference”… .

According to the grand jury minutes, the defendant, who was a custodian at a school for more than a decade, was eating a sandwich in the school’s faculty break room when a teacher entered the room and asked how he was doing after the first week of school. The defendant allegedly told the teacher that another teacher was on his “shit list,” and that “people better stay out of [his] way.” When the teacher told him, among other things, that he should “try to relax a little bit” and that “we all have to like work together here,” the defendant allegedly got out of his chair and told the teacher that she “better be absent the day they fire me because I am going to come in here and Columbine this shit.” He then mimed shooting a gun while imitating gun noises. Based upon his statements, the defendant was charged in an indictment with making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20), a class D felony.

Penal Law article 490 was enacted shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, to ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and punished in state courts with appropriate severity … . In construing the statute, courts must be cognizant that “the concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act” … . Penal Law § 490.20(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when with intent to intimidate . . . a civilian population . . . he or she threatens to commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and thereby causes a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such offense.”

Contrary to the People’s contentions, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to dismiss the indictment since the People failed to present legally sufficient evidence that the defendant’s comment caused a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of a specified offense … . The teacher testified that she did not believe that the defendant’s threat of a school shooting was imminent and, therefore, she waited to report the defendant’s comment. Moreover, the defendant’s alleged threat was expressly conditioned by the phrase, “the day they fire me.” The People did not present any evidence that the defendant was about to be terminated from his job, or had any reason to believe that he was going to be terminated. People v Hulsen, 2017 NY Slip Op 04294, 2nd Dept 5-31-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (TERRORISTIC THREAT, EVIDENCE, SCHOOL CUSTODIAN’S STATEMENT TO A TEACHER THAT ON THE DAY HE IS FIRED HE WILL COME IN AND ‘COLUMBINE THIS SHIT’ DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A TERRORISTIC THREAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PENAL LAW, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AFTER A READING OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS PROPER)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, TERRORISTIC THREAT, SCHOOL CUSTODIAN’S STATEMENT TO A TEACHER THAT ON THE DAY HE IS FIRED HE WILL COME IN AND ‘COLUMBINE THIS SHIT’ DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A TERRORISTIC THREAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PENAL LAW, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AFTER A READING OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS PROPER)/GRAND JURY (EVIDENCE, TERRORISTIC THREAT,  SCHOOL CUSTODIAN’S STATEMENT TO A TEACHER THAT ON THE DAY HE IS FIRED HE WILL COME IN AND ‘COLUMBINE THIS SHIT’ DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A TERRORISTIC THREAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PENAL LAW, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AFTER A READING OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS PROPER)/TERRORISM (CRIMINAL LAW, TERRORISTIC THREAT, SCHOOL CUSTODIAN’S STATEMENT TO A TEACHER THAT ON THE DAY HE IS FIRED HE WILL COME IN AND ‘COLUMBINE THIS SHIT’ DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A TERRORISTIC THREAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PENAL LAW, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AFTER A READING OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WAS PROPER)

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