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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence should have been granted in this car-bus collision case. Plaintiff testified he had a green light. The bus driver (Puntarich) testified he had a green turn arrow. The jury found the bus driver negligent but his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The Second Department noted that, because of the conflicting factual allegations, a motion to set aside the verdict as a matter of law could not be granted:

“A jury finding that a party was negligent but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause'” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence, as the finding that Puntarich’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident did not rest upon a fair interpretation of the credible evidence … . However, that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law was properly denied, as issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff also was at fault in causing the accident … .  Mancini v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 03939, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT, NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT, NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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