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CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s causes of action based upon loans repayable on demand accrued when the loan was made, rendering them time-barred, despite the provision that payment became due three months after a demand for payment:

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Here, the parties’ agreement … provided that the sums loaned to the defendants were repayable on demand. Accordingly, the plaintiff possessed a legal right to demand payment at the time that each loan was advanced to the defendants, and the statute of limitations began to run at each of those respective times … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the three-month period for repayment following a demand did not constitute a condition that had to be fulfilled before the right to final payment arose… . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss as time-barred so much of the first cause of action as was predicated upon loans that allegedly were made more than six years prior to the commencement of the action. Elia v Perla, 2017 NY Slip Op 03930, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE)/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON A LOAN PAYABLE UPON DEMAND ACCRUES WHEN THE LOAN IS MADE)

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