You are here: / / UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT.
, , ,

UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT.

The Second Department determined the owner of a parking lot (Berkshire) could assert cross claims against the lessee of the parking lot (Livingston), even though the lessee did not know the lease was entered into by an undisclosed agent of the owner. Plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall on the sidewalk adjacent to the parking lot. The owner cross-claimed for indemnification by the lessee:

Berkshire may enforce provisions of Livingston’s lease for the parking lot. An undisclosed principal may sue on a contract made in the name of its agent unless there is a showing of fraud … . Here, Livingston’s submissions confirmed that Berkshire owned the property that Livingston was renting, and that the lease was valid. Livingston does not assert that it would not have entered into the lease had it known then that Berkshire was, in fact, the owner. Although Livingston was not aware that Berkshire had authorized an agent to enter into the lease on its behalf, Livingston cannot escape liability on the contract by claiming ignorance of the undisclosed principal’s existence … . Simmons v Berkshire Equity, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 03208, 2nd Dept 4-26-17

CONTRACT LAW (UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT)/AGENCY (UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT)/LANDLORD-TENANT (UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT)/NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST LESSEE BASED ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT)/AGENCY (UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL CAN SUE ON A LEASE ENTERED INTO BY ITS AGENT)

You might also like
IN THIS PARKING-LOT-ICE SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE SNOW REMOVAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM AND THE PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; THE DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENSE WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO A PROHIBITED CONVERSATION BETWEEN A COURT OFFICER AND JURORS BY ASKING THAT DELIBERATIONS CONTINUE DESPITE THE CONVERSATION; THE CONVERSATION DID NOT CONSTITUTE A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR.
NEW AUDI DEALERSHIP WAS OUTSIDE PLAINTIFF DEALERSHIP’S MARKET AREA, SUIT UNDER THE DEALER ACT PROPERLY DISMISSED.
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT INVESTIGATE ALIBI EVIDENCE, DID NOT OBJECT TO EVIDENCE WHICH HAD BEEN RULED OFF LIMITS, AND DID NOT IMPEACH THE COMPLAINANT WITH INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS NOT FREE TO LEAVE AFTER A STREET STOP AND WAS INTERROGATED WITHOUT HAVING BEEN AFFORDED THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF CONTRACTOR DID NOT ALLEGE IT WAS LICENSED TO DO HOME IMPROVEMENT WORK IN ITS COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT AND SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ON A MECHANIC’S LIEN, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
VILLAGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES DID NOT FAIL TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE... PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF COMMON...