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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE...
Civil Procedure, Negligence

MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend his bill of particulars to reflect a different date for the injury allegedly caused by defendant’s employees during a carpet delivery should not have been granted. The motion was made on the eve of trial more than four years after the action was commenced and after plaintiff had repeatedly asserted the date during discovery. It turned out that no delivery was made by defendant on the date alleged in the pleadings:

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“Generally, [i]n the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit'”… . Where, however, the application for leave to amend is made long after the action has been certified for trial, judicial discretion in allowing such amendments should be discreet, circumspect, prudent, and cautious… . “Moreover, when . . . leave is sought on the eve of trial, judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly” … .

Here, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend his bill of particulars more than four years after the action was commenced, and almost a year after the matter was stricken from the trial calendar. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to amend the bill of particulars, as the defendant demonstrated that it would suffer significant prejudice as a result of the unexplained delay … . Tabak v Shaw Indus., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 03213, 2nd Dept 4-26-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENCE  (MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/BILL OF PARTICULARS, MOTION TO AMEND  (NEGLIGENCE, MOTION, ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

April 26, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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