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BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE.

The First Department determined defendant bar (BR Guest’s) was not vicariously liable for an assault on plaintiff by a security guard (DiPaola), who was an independent contractor:

The record establishes that DiPaola, a security guard, was an independent contractor when the incident occurred … . The evidence shows that DiPaola was not on BR Guest’s payroll, did not receive health insurance or other fringe benefits, and that BR Guest contracted for his services as a security guard from defendant Presidium, LLC … .

The record reveals nothing more than general supervisory control, which cannot form the basis for imposing liability against BR Guest or Hanson, who was the vice president of BR Guest Inc., for plaintiff’s injuries sustained as a result of DiPaola’s assault … . The fact that BR Guest decided the number of security guards needed on a particular night and where on the premises the guards should be posted at any given time, and gave them instructions relating to the manner in which they performed their work does not render the security guards working at the premises special employees … . McLaughlan v BR Guest, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02906, 1st Dept 4-13-17

 

INTENTIONAL TORTS (BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/ASSAULT (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/ASSAULT (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/SECURITY GUARDS  (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)

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