You are here: / / BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR,...

BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE.

The First Department determined defendant bar (BR Guest’s) was not vicariously liable for an assault on plaintiff by a security guard (DiPaola), who was an independent contractor:

The record establishes that DiPaola, a security guard, was an independent contractor when the incident occurred … . The evidence shows that DiPaola was not on BR Guest’s payroll, did not receive health insurance or other fringe benefits, and that BR Guest contracted for his services as a security guard from defendant Presidium, LLC … .

The record reveals nothing more than general supervisory control, which cannot form the basis for imposing liability against BR Guest or Hanson, who was the vice president of BR Guest Inc., for plaintiff’s injuries sustained as a result of DiPaola’s assault … . The fact that BR Guest decided the number of security guards needed on a particular night and where on the premises the guards should be posted at any given time, and gave them instructions relating to the manner in which they performed their work does not render the security guards working at the premises special employees … . McLaughlan v BR Guest, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02906, 1st Dept 4-13-17

 

INTENTIONAL TORTS (BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/ASSAULT (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/ASSAULT (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)/SECURITY GUARDS  (INTENTIONAL TORT, BAR NOT LIABLE FOR ASSAULT BY SECURITY GUARD WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE)

You might also like
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TENANT ENTITLED TO RESCIND LEASE BECAUSE CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY PROHIBITED TENANT’S USE OF THE PROPERTY FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES.
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE COLLAPSE OF A CEILING CAUSED A BULGING DISC IN HER SPINE; SUPREME COURT HELD THE SURGERY TO REPAIR THE DISC CONSTITUTED SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND PROHIBITED PLAINTIFF FROM INTRODUCING ANY EVIDENCE OF THE SPINE INJURY; THE 1ST DEPARTMENT REVERSED HOLDING THAT A SPOLIATION ANALYSIS CANNOT BE APPLIED TO MEDICAL TREATMENT (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT DRIVER ADMITTED IN THE ACCIDENT REPORT HE WAS AWARE THE ROADS WERE WET AND SLIPPERY AT THE TIME THE DEFENDANT’S BUS SKIDDED INTO PLAINTIFF’S BUS AFTER HITTING A PUDDLE, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS GOING TOO FAST FOR CONDITIONS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S DENIAL OF HIS ADMISSION IN HIS AFFIDAVIT OPPOSING THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT).
OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD MAY BE LIABLE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE PURSUANT TO A 2019 COURT OF APPEALS DECISION; VIOLATION OF NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE STORM IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF FELL ATTEMPTING TO USE AN INVERTED BUCKET TO STEP UP TO AN ELEVATED PLATFORM (FIRST DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM.
ACCORDING TO THE MEDICAL RECORDS, PLAINTIFF PROVIDED HER TREATING PHYSICIAN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF HER SLIP AND FALL WHICH DIFFERED FROM HER DESCRIPTION IN HER DEPOSITION TESTIMONY; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA SERVED ON THE PHYSICIAN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
NO APPEAL LIES FROM DECLINING TO SIGN AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ISSUE OF FACT ABOUT MEANING OF AN EXCLUSION IN A FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY. QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION APPLIED (LABOR LAW 240...