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CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the child support provisions of a stipulation of settlement in this divorce action should not be enforced because the children’s right to child support was jeopardized. Because the stipulation put a cap on father’s child support obligations, it was possible payment of room and board (college) for one sibling could exceed the cap leaving the other siblings without support:

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“[T]he parties cannot contract away the duty of child support. Despite the fact that a separation agreement is entitled to the solemnity and obligation of a contract, when children’s rights are involved the contract yields to the welfare of the children. The duty of a parent to support his or her child shall not be eliminated or diminished by the terms of a separation agreement, nor can it be abrogated by contract” … .

The agreement here violates this rule. The credit sought by the father takes away that portion of child support intended for the welfare of the other two children. Taken to its logical end, the agreement threatens to completely deprive the other children of any support whatsoever, if monthly room and board costs for one child were to exceed $2,500. Keller-Goldman v Goldman, 2017 NY Slip Op 02723, 1st Dept 4-6-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT)/CONTRACT LAW (STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, DIVORCE, CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT)/CHILD SUPPORT (STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT)/STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT (CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT)/DIVORCE  (CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE ENFORCED BECAUSE THE CAP ON CHILD SUPPORT MAY DEPRIVE CHILDREN OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPORT)

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