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RACE TRACK WAIVER OF LIABILITY INVALID, PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK NOT APPLICABLE, IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK APPLICABLE, LAW OF THE CASE DID NOT PRECLUDE DIRECTED VERDICT AFTER DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SAME ISSUES.

The Fourth Department, in a substantive decision dealing with several liability and damages issues not summarized here, determined the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict finding the liability waiver invalid and the doctrine of primary assumption of risk inapplicable. The Fourth Department concluded the doctrine of implied assumption of risk was applicable, however. The Fourth Department further held that the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the court from directing a verdict in plaintiff’s favor after denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the same issues. Plaintiff’s son was in an auto race at defendant race track. Plaintiff was in the pit area when defendant driver (Holland) backed his car into plaintiff:

Contrary to defendants’ contention, the court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict establishing that the liability waiver was invalid and that the action was not barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, inasmuch as there was “no rational process” by which the jury could have found in favor of defendants on those issues … . With respect to the waiver, General Obligations Law § 5-326 voids any such agreement entered into in connection with, as relevant here, the payment of a fee by a “user” to enter a place of recreation. Plaintiff testified at trial that he was a mere spectator on the night of the accident, thereby establishing that he was a user entitled to the benefit of section 5-326 … , and there was no evidence from which the jury could have rationally found that plaintiff was a participant in the event whose attendance was “meant to further the speedway venture” … . …

With respect to the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, we conclude that the risk that a pedestrian will be struck by a driver backing up in the pit area, well before the driver is participating in a race, is not inherent in the activity of automobile racing … , and thus that the doctrine is inapplicable to this case … .

We reject defendants’ further contention that the doctrine of law of the case precluded the court from directing a verdict in plaintiff’s favor after it had denied prior motions by plaintiff directed at the issues of waiver and primary assumption of the risk, including a motion for partial summary judgment. ” A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not necessarily . . . the law of the case that there is an issue of fact in the case that will be established at the trial’ “… . …

We further agree with defendants that a charge on implied assumption of the risk should have been given because there was evidence that plaintiff “disregard[ed] a known risk by voluntarily being in a dangerous area” … . Inasmuch as the jury was properly instructed on comparative negligence and apportioned 20% of the liability for the accident to plaintiff, however, we conclude that this error did not prejudice a substantial right of defendants and thus does not warrant reversal … . Knight v Holland, 2017 NY Slip Op 02525, 4th Dept 3-31-17

 

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