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NOTICE OF DISCLAIMER SENT TO PLAINTIFF’S INSURER WAS NOT EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined a notice of disclaimer sent by defendant insurer (FMIC) to plaintiff’s insurer (Mt.Hawley) was not sufficient to disclaim coverage of plaintiff (Harco):

Here, although Mt. Hawley was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs when it sent notice of the occurrence to FMIC and demanded that FMIC assume the plaintiffs’ defense and indemnification in connection with any lawsuits arising from the incident, that did not make Mt. Hawley the plaintiffs’ agent for all purposes, or for the specific purpose that is relevant here: receipt of a notice of disclaimer … . Contrary to FMIC’s contention, Mt. Hawley’s interests were not necessarily the same as Harco’s in this litigation and because Harco had its own interests at stake, separate from that of Mt. Hawley, Harco was entitled to notice delivered to it … . Since FMIC failed to provide timely notice of its denial of coverage on the basis of a policy exclusion to Harco, it is estopped from disclaiming insurance coverage on that ground … . Harco Constr., LLC v First Mercury Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 01846, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

INSURANCE LAW (NOTICE OF DISCLAIMER SENT TO PLAINTIFF’S INSURER WAS NOT EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF)/DISCLAIMER (INSURANCE LAW, NOTICE OF DISCLAIMER SENT TO PLAINTIFF’S INSURER WAS NOT EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF)

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