You are here: / / FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DENIED COUNTY’S APPLICATION...

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DENIED COUNTY’S APPLICATION FOR PATERNITY DNA TESTING WITHOUT REQUIRING PUTATIVE FATHER TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE; COUNTY HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO BRING A PATERNITY ACTION WHEN THE MOTHER OR CHILD IS LIKELY TO BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have denied, without a hearing, the County’s request for DNA paternity testing. The putative father had not raised a question of fact to support his assertion of the equitable estoppel defense (demonstrating that another had developed a father-child relationship). Only after determining whether equitable estoppel defense applies can the propriety of DNA testing be considered. The County has the statutory authority to bring a paternity proceeding when the mother or child is likely to become a public charge:

… [A]rticle 5 of the Family Court Act still retains as an objective the protection of the public from bearing the cost of supporting . . . children where there exists a viable, legally obligated source of support” … . Accordingly, “section 522 of the Family Court Act provides that, among other persons, a public welfare official of the county, city or town where the mother resides, or the child is found, may originate such proceedings, if the mother or child is or is likely to become a public charge'” … . * * *

… [T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used by a purported biological father to prevent an adverse party from asserting that he is the biological father where the child has developed a close relationship with another father figure such that it would be detrimental to the child’s interests to disrupt that relationship … . Under such circumstances, in order to be entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether equitable estoppel should be applied, a putative father must raise an issue of fact as to whether “a determination that he is in fact the father would disturb any relationship the child[ ] may have had with any other father figure” … . “[W]hether it is being used in the offensive posture to enforce rights or the defensive posture to prevent rights from being enforced, equitable estoppel is only to be used to protect the best interests of the child” … . …

The Family Court … erred to the extent that it based its order dismissing the petition on its prior determination, in effect, denying the County’s application for DNA testing. The Family Court should not have summarily denied the County’s application without first requiring the putative father to raise an issue of fact with respect to his defense of equitable estoppel … . Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v James D., 2017 NY Slip Op 01369, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

 

FAMILY LAW (PATERNITY, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DENIED COUNTY’S APPLICATION FOR PATERNITY DNA TESTING WITHOUT REQUIRING PUTATIVE FATHER TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE)/PATERNITY (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DENIED COUNTY’S APPLICATION FOR PATERNITY DNA TESTING WITHOUT REQUIRING PUTATIVE FATHER TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE)/DNA TESTING (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DENIED COUNTY’S APPLICATION FOR PATERNITY DNA TESTING WITHOUT REQUIRING PUTATIVE FATHER TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE)/FAMILY LAW (PATERNITY, COUNTY HAS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO BRING A PATERNITY ACTION WHEN THE MOTHER OR CHILD IS LIKELYT TO BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE)/PATERNITY (COUNTY HAS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO BRING A PATERNITY ACTION WHEN THE MOTHER OR CHILD IS LIKELYT TO BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE)/PUBLIC CHARGE (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, COUNTY HAS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO BRING A PATERNITY ACTION WHEN THE MOTHER OR CHILD IS LIKELYT TO BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE)

You might also like
FAILURE TO APPLY FOR A STAY OF ARBITRATION WAIVES ANY CLAIM THE ARBITRATOR HAS EXCEEDED HIS/HER POWERS.
Waiver of Right to Appeal Invalid Despite the Signing of a Written Waiver
PLAINTIFF UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PRIVITY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT; SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
EVIDENCE OF STANDING DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY EXCEPTION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE INTERNET RESEARCH TO MAKE A SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT THE BANK HAD STANDING (SECOND DEPT).
MORTGAGES ISSUED BY NYS FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM NYS MORTGAGE RECORDING TAX (SECOND DEPT).
“Conclusory” Affidavit Submitted In Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action Did Not Demonstrate the Allegation Defendants Were Directly Liable for Negligent Maintenance of a Taxi Cab Was “Not a Fact At All”—Analytical Criteria Explained
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DID NOT PASS TO THE FOREIGN (DELAWARE) CORPORATION AFTER A MERGER AND ACQUISITION OF NEW YORK BUSINESS ENTITIES; THEREFORE THE NEW YORK PARTIES, IN THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST THE ATTORNEYS WHO REPRESENTED THEM IN THE TRANSACTION, CAN SEEK ACCESS TO THE ATTORNEYS’ PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE TRANSACTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED PENDENTE LITE MAINTENANCE DESPITE WAIVER OF... ABSENT PROOF OF 16-YEAR-OLD CHILD’S COLLEGE PLANS, ANY AWARD OF COLLEGE EXPENSES...