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PLACE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION TO CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DID NOT APPLY WHERE DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYER PROHIBITED POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN THE WORKPLACE.

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined defendant was not entitled to the exception to the criminal possession of a weapon statute for possession in a person’s “place of business” (reducing the offense to a misdemeanor). Here defendant brought a firearm to work at McDonald’s and shot himself in the leg. The court reasoned the “place of business” exception did not apply because McDonald’s prohibited its employees from carrying firearms:

Although the “place of business” exception is not statutorily defined, it has been “construed narrowly by the courts in an effort to balance the State’s strong policy to severely restrict possession of any firearm’ . . . with its policy to treat with leniency persons attempting to protect certain areas in which they have a possessory interest and to which members of the public have limited access” … . Inasmuch as the evidence at trial established that defendant was prohibited from bringing a gun to work, we conclude that to permit defendant to be subjected only to a misdemeanor “would certainly controvert the meaning and intent of the statute” … . People v Wallace, 2017 NY Slip Op 01071, 4th Dept 2-10-17

CRIMINAL LAW (PLACE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION TO CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DID NOT APPLY WHERE DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYER PROHIBITED POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN THE WORKPLACE)/WEAPONS, CRIMINAL POSSESSION (PLACE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION TO CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DID NOT APPLY WHERE DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYER PROHIBITED POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN THE WORKPLACE)

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