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DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE OF DEFENSE EXPERT’S OPINION INADEQUATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have granted plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the verdict in this medical malpractice action. The defendants’ notice of the expert opinion evidence to be presented at trial did not notify plaintiffs that the expert would testify plaintiff’s stroke was caused by a piece of calcium, not a blood clot. Plaintiffs’ malpractice theory was based entirely on the allegation a blood clot was the cause of the stroke. The court explained the notice requirements:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict in favor of [defendants] and against the plaintiffs on the issue of liability. Pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), [defendants] were required to disclose “in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, . . . and a summary of the grounds for each expert’s opinion.” Here, [the] expert witness disclosure only revealed expert testimony that [plaintiff’s] stroke was not caused by his atrial fibrillation or a blood clot, but did not inform the plaintiffs that the expert would testify that the stroke was caused by calcification. [Defendant] failed to demonstrate good cause for not disclosing the substance of his expert’s causation theory until trial … . The revelation of the defendants’ causation theory at trial prejudiced the plaintiffs’ ability to prepare for trial because they did not have adequate time to consult or retain an expert neuroradiologist … . Rocco v Ahmed, 2017 NY Slip Op 00207, 2nd Dept 1-11-17

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE OF DEFENSE EXPERT’S OPINION INADEQUATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRCTICE (DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE OF DEFENSE EXPERT’S OPINION INADEQUATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOTICE OF EXPERT OPINION, DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE OF DEFENSE EXPERT’S OPINION INADEQUATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE OF DEFENSE EXPERT’S OPINION INADEQUATE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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