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TERMS OF CONTRACT WERE NOT ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL, MOTION TO DIMSISS BREACH AND REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The First Department, over a two justice dissent, determined that the motion to dismiss the breach and repudiation of contract cause of action should not have been granted. The decision is fact-specific and cannot fairly be summarized here. In essence, plaintiff alleged the defendant did not have the right under the contract to refuse to cooperate in the settlement of a claim for the full amount.  The majority concluded the language of the contract did not provide defendant with an unconditional and absolute right to refuse to cooperate by refusing to agree to certain reassignments of claims as part of the settlement:

Characterizing the assignment of the … claims as absolute and unconditional, the dissent … would hold that plaintiff did not have a contractual right to compel [defendant] to reassign those claims to a third party as a condition of a settlement that attributed no value to them. However, contrary to these findings, the assignment was not absolute and unconditional … . Guidance Enhanced Green Terrain, LLC v Bank of Am. Merrill Lynch, 2017 NY Slip Op 00068, 1st Dept 1-5-17

CONTRACT LAW (TERMS OF CONTRACT WERE NOT ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL, MOTION TO DIMSISS BREACH AND REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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