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GUILTY PLEA INDUCED BY AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE VACATED.

The Second Department vacated defendant’s conviction because the guilty plea was induced by an unfulfilled promise:

In June 2013, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant was advised that if he failed to complete a Mental Health Court program, the court would sentence him to a term of imprisonment on his plea of guilty to attempted assault in the second degree, and that his plea of guilty to assault in the third degree would be vacated. The defendant did not successfully complete the program. At sentencing, however, instead of vacating the defendant’s plea of guilty to assault in the third degree, the County Court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment upon that plea, to run concurrently with the term of imprisonment imposed on his conviction of attempted assault in the second degree.

“[A] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored”… .  People v Rohan, 2016 NY Slip Op 08251, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GUILTY PLEA INDUCED BY AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE VACATED)/SENTENCING (GUILTY PLEA INDUCED BY AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE VACATED)

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