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NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY.

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s wrongful termination suit against the county was properly dismissed for failure to file a notice of claim. The court noted that the notice of claim requirement for suits against cities is more narrow and applies only to tort cases. The notice of claim requirements for suits against counties are not limited to tort actions:

County Law § 52 (1) broadly provides that “[a]ny claim . . . against a county for damage [or] injury . . . and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity, alleged to have been caused . . . by or because of any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with [General Municipal Law § 50-e]” … . Here, plaintiff’s complaint sought damages for wrongful termination and, thus, pursuant to County Law § 52 (1), General Municipal Law § 50-e (1) (a) required service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim for retaliatory termination arose. It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim, entitling defendant to dismissal of the complaint … .

Plaintiff’s reliance on appellate decisions involving complaints asserting a Civil Service Law § 75-b or similar claims against cities, in which the courts have ruled that the filing of a notice of claim is not required … , is misplaced. The cases cited by plaintiff involve claims against cities to which the more narrow notice of claim provisions of General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i apply, limiting the requirement for notices of claim to “tort” claims (General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]) or claims for “personal injury, wrongful death or damage to real or personal property” (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]). Sager v County of Sullivan, 2016 NY Slip Op 08152, 3rd Dept 12-1-16

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/WRONGFUL TERMINATION (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/COUNTIES (WRONGFUL TERMINATION, NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)

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