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PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

The First Department determined the conclusory allegations in defendant’s motion to suppress were sufficient, under the circumstances, to warrant a suppression hearing:

In People v Wynn (117 AD3d 487 [1st Dept 2014]), we held that the court erred in summarily denying the motion of defendant’s codefendant to suppress statements and physical evidence as the fruits of an unlawful arrest, notwithstanding the conclusory nature of the factual allegations in her suppression motion, where “[a]lthough the People provided defendant with extensive information about the facts of the crime and the proof to be offered at trial, they provided no information whatsoever, at any stage of the proceedings, about how defendant came to be a suspect, and the basis for her arrest, made hours after the crime at a different location” (id. at 487-488). Because the factual allegations in the People’s pleadings and relevant disclosures were materially the same in this case, we conclude that defendant’s motion to suppress, although it asserted nothing more than that probable cause was lacking, was sufficient under the circumstances to entitle him to a hearing. Unlike the situation in People v Lopez (5 NY3d 753, 754 [2005]), defendant’s statement did not “on its face show[] probable cause for defendant’s arrest.” People v Terry, 2016 NY Slip Op 07751, 1st Dept 11-17-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS)/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (STATEMENTS, PAUCITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR HER ARREST WARRANTED A SUPPRESSION HEARING DESPITE THE CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS)

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