You are here: / / FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL...
,

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PETITION TO VACATE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.

Under the unique facts, the Second Department determined Family Court should not have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prohibit Omar from contesting paternity. Omar had signed an acknowledgment of paternity two days after the child was born. However, twice thereafter Omar filed petitions to vacate his acknowledgment supported by DNA tests:

Family Court should have declined to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ” Collateral estoppel, an equitable doctrine, is based upon the general notion that a party, or one in privity with a party, should not be permitted to relitigate an issue decided against it'” … . “[W]hether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends upon general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation'” … . The doctrine is highly flexible in nature, and should not be rigidly or mechanically applied, even where its technical requirements are met … . “[T]he fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of what are often competing policy considerations, including fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of the court and the litigants, and the societal interests in consistent and accurate results. No rigid rules are possible, because even these factors may vary in relative importance depending on the nature of the proceedings” … .

Here, the nature of the proceedings is highly relevant, as it involves the determination of the paternity of a child not yet seven years of age. Although Omar executed an acknowledgment of paternity two days after the subject child’s birth in November 2009, he obtained, in 2011, a private DNA test indicating that he could not be the father. In 2013, the mother consented to the vacatur of the acknowledgment of paternity based upon the results of a second DNA test. Moreover, at a 2014 court appearance, the mother advised the Support Magistrate, in contrast to statements she made in connection with Omar’s first petition, that she was involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with Britton at the time of the child’s conception. Under these circumstances, there is potential merit to Omar’s second petition … . It is also significant to note that neither Omar nor the mother was represented by counsel in connection with Omar’s first petition … , and that Omar was still unrepresented when the Support Magistrate instructed him to file a second petition after he unsuccessfully attempted to restore the first petition.

Taking into consideration the particular facts of this case, we are persuaded that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not promote fairness to the parties. Matter of Kaori (Omar J.–Shalette S.), 2016 NY Slip Op 07649, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

 

FAMILY LAW (PATERNITY, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PETITION TO VACATE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY)/PATERNITY (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PETITION TO VACATE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY)/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DENY A PETITION TO VACATE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY)

You might also like
DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERS FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER; COUNTY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THE MANDATORY STATUTORY HEARING; APPEAL IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF LASTING CONSEQUENCES OF THE ‘DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER’ FINDING (SECOND DEPT).
REVIEW POWERS OF A MASTER ARBITRATOR EXPLAINED; HERE THE MASTER ARBITRATOR’S AWARD WAS PROPERLY VACATED AND THE ORIGINAL ARBITRATOR’S AWARD WAS PROPERLY REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT).
THE TWO COUNTS OF ROBBERY THIRD WERE CONCURRENT INCLUSORY COUNTS OF THE TWO COUNTS OF ROBBERY SECOND; CONVICTIONS ON THE ROBBERY SECOND COUNTS REQUIRED VACATION OF THE CONVICTIONS ON THE ROBBERY THIRD COUNTS AND THE RELATED SENTENCES (SECOND DEPT).
In Opposing a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely File a Note of Issue, No Need to Show Potentially Meritorious Cause of Action Where Defendant Contributed to the Delay
THE JUDGE’S INTERFERENCE IN AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEFENSE SUMMATION AND IMPROPER EXCLUSION AND ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED TO CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, WHO ARE NOT POLICE OFFICERS, AS WELL AS POLICES OFFICERS, AND THE SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED BY BOTH POLICE OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONS OFFICERS; NEITHER THE SEARCH WARRANT NOR THE SEARCH WAS THEREBY RENDERED INVALID (SECOND DEPT).
THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE ASSAULT SECOND AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ACTS, THEREFORE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE NOT WARRANTED; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER BASED ON A NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WHICH WAS NOT A FELONY IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT). ​
Questions of Fact Raised About Fairness of Facially Valid Prenuptial Agreement

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED INDICTMENT ON GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT... FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LABOR...