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PROOF OF SPECIFIC AS OPPOSED TO GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL; FAILURE TO ALLEGE ANY ESPINAL EXCEPTION MANDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CLEANING CONTRACTOR.

Although the facts were not explained, the Second Department determined proof of “specific,” as opposed to “general,” cleaning practices, “under the circumstances,” was sufficient to meet defendant’s burden demonstrating the absence of constructive notice of the condition which caused plaintiff to fall (not specified in the decision). In addition, because plaintiff did not allege any of the “Espinal” exceptions, proof the plaintiff was not a party to the building owner’s contract with the cleaning contractor was sufficient to warrant summary judgment in favor of the contractor:

A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it … . To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant is required to offer some evidence as to when the accident site was last cleaned or inspected prior to the plaintiff’s fall … . Although submission of evidence as to the defendant’s general cleaning practices is generally insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, specific evidence as to cleaning practices may be adequate, depending on the circumstances of the case … .

Here, the owner satisfied its prima facie burden through submission of the deposition testimony of an employee of the contractor and the building concierge employed by the owner. The testimony of the building concierge, and the testimony of the contractor’s employee regarding the frequency of the employee’s inspections of the area where the injured plaintiff fell, established, prima facie, that the owner did not have constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition … . Mavis v Rexcorp Realty, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 06476, 2nd Dept 10-5-16

NEGLIGENCE (PROOF OF SPECIFIC AS OPPOSED TO GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)/SLIP AND FALL (PROOF OF SPECIFIC AS OPPOSED TO GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)/EVIDENCE (SLIP AND FALL, PROOF OF SPECIFIC AS OPPOSED TO GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO FALL)/CONTRACT LAW (SLIP AND FALL, FAILURE TO ALLEGE ANY ESPINAL EXCEPTION MANDATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CLEANING CONTRACTOR)

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