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DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant (Dick) in this rear-end collision case demonstrated freedom from fault and was entitled to summary judgment. The evidence, including plaintiff’s testimony, demonstrated defendant’s vehicle was struck from behind while stopped behind plaintiff, and thereby pushed into contact with the rear of plaintiff’s vehicle. It was alleged that defendant’s vehicle was struck from behind by a Verizon truck which left the scene. That there was a question of fact whether any Verizon truck was involved in the accident had no effect on defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment:

“The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway” … . Hence, “[a] rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the moving vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision” … . “Evidence that a vehicle was struck in the rear and propelled into the vehicle in front of it may provide a sufficient non-negligent explanation” … .

Here, Dick established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that his stopped vehicle was propelled forward into the plaintiff’s vehicle after his vehicle was struck in the rear by a third vehicle, and that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . In opposition, the Verizon defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Dick was at fault in the happening of the accident … . Contrary to the Verizon defendants’ contention, the issue of whether they owned the third vehicle which struck Dick’s vehicle is not relevant to the determination of this motion. Wooldridge-Solano v Dick, 2016 NY Slip Op 06488, 2nd Dept 10-5-16

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/EVIDENCE (REAR-END COLLISION, DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (REAR-END COLLISION, DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/COMPARATIVE FAULT (REAR-END COLLISION, DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/REAR-END COLLISION (DEFENDANT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DEMONSTRATED FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

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