You are here: / / IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT ...
, ,

IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a two-justice dissent, determined the First Department’s prior ruling that a search warrant was invalid was the law of the case. The trial court had ruled new evidence demonstrated the validity of the warrant and granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendants (the city and police officers who procured and executed the search warrant). The plaintiffs, who had been pushed to the floor at gunpoint, handcuffed, and held for three hours while their apartment was searched (and trashed), sued alleging the violation of their civil rights:

This case gives us the opportunity to emphasize that when an issue is specifically decided on a motion for summary judgment, that determination is the law of the case. As such, the trial court, as well as the parties, are bound by it “absent a showing of subsequent evidence or change of law” … . Applying this rule to the case at hand, we specifically found in Delgado v City of New York (86 AD3d 502, 508 [1st Dept 2011] [Delgado I]), that the no-knock search warrant at issue was not valid. Thus, the trial court was bound by that determination absent the introduction of subsequent evidence to show otherwise. The evidence that was introduced at trial on the validity of the warrant, however, was not significantly different from what was previously before the court on the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred in deeming the warrant valid and granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict in their favor. * * *

Whether this Court’s conclusion regarding the validity of the search warrant in Delgado I was erroneously reached is irrelevant. The law of the case precluded the trial court from re-examining the issue (see Carmona, 92 AD3d at 492-493), and it was therefore bound by our conclusion regardless of its views on our analysis … .

At the very least, the issue as to the validity of the search warrant should have gone before the jury since the additional evidence adduced at trial did not significantly alter our analysis. Instead, acting essentially as an appellate court, the trial court effectively reversed this Court’s finding on the validity of the warrant. Delgado v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06185, 1st Dept 9-27-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/CRIMINAL LAW ((IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)/LAW OF THE CASE (IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, PRIOR APPELLATE RULING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID BECAME THE LAW OF THE CASE; TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THE WARRANT VALID AND GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE POLICE REVERSED)

You might also like
ACCOUNTING CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; ALTHOUGH SUA SPONTE ORDERS ARE NOT APPEALABLE, THE APPEAL WAS HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; PROPER WAY TO HANDLE A SUA SPONTE ORDER IS TO MOVE TO VACATE AND THEN APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).
EXCLUSION FOR INJURY DURING UNLOADING AN INSURED TRAILER APPLIED, EVEN THOUGH THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TRAILER.
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
A LEASE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND DEFENDANTS (ONE OF WHOM WAS A MEMBER OF PLAINTIFF’S BOARD) WAS NOT VOTED ON BY A MAJORITY OF DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS AND WAS THEREFORE VOIDABLE UNDER BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 713(B); DEFENDANTS BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARAY DUTY TO THE CORPORATION BY SUBLETTING THE LEASED PREMISES FOR A MUCH HIGHER RENT WITHOUT PLAINTIFF’S KNOWLEDGE (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD WITH NO GUARDRAILS; DEFENDANTS’ AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING GUARDRAILS WERE AVAILABLE WAS NOT BASED ON FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE AND THEREFORE DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
IN NEW YORK THERE ARE NO CAUSES OF ACTION FOR “PRECONCEPTION NEGLIGENCE” OR “WRONGFUL LIFE;” HERE MOTHER ALLEGED THE DRUG SHE HAD BEEN TAKING FOR EPILEPSY BEFORE SHE LEARNED SHE WAS PREGNANT CAUSED THE BABY TO BE BORN WITH SPINA BIFIDA (FIRST DEPT). ​
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).
A CLAIM WHICH ARISES AFTER THE FILING OF A BANKRUPTCY PETITION BELONGS TO THE DEBTOR, NOT TO THE BANKRUPCTY ESTATE (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED... TERMINATION OF TENURED TEACHER WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR...