You are here: / / NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN...
,

NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant, Gordon, was entitled to compel arbitration with an entity which was not a party to the document with the arbitration provision. Plaintiff, BGC Notes, loaned $700,000 to Gordon as part of an employment arrangement with another related entity, BGC Financial. The employment agreement contained the arbitration clause and the note for the loan required resolution of any disputes in the courts. Although BGC Notes was not was not a party to the employment agreement, it was deemed to receive a direct benefit from the employment agreement. Therefore BGC Notes was subject to the arbitration clause in the agreement:

Although BGC Notes was not a signatory to the employment agreement, which is the document actually containing the arbitration provision, BGC Notes nonetheless received a “direct benefit” directly traceable to the employment agreement … . Specifically, section 3(d) of the employment agreement provides that BGC Financial would “cause” BGC Notes to make a loan to Gordon by way of the very note that BGC Notes sues upon in this action, and BGC Notes received all the benefits that an entity ordinarily receives upon the giving of a loan … . Thus, BGC Notes derived benefits from the employment agreement, and BGC Notes’ contention that section 3(d) conferred a benefit only to Gordon, and at most an “indirect” benefit to BGC Notes itself, belies the terms of the employment agreement … . BGC Notes, LLC v Gordon, 2016 NY Slip Op 05775, 1st Dept 8-11-16

ARBITRATION (NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)/CONTRACT LAW (ARBITRATION, NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)

You might also like
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITION; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
ACTIONS PURSUANT TO NEW YORK CITY’S “FREELANCE ISN’T FREE ACT” (FIFA) WHICH ALLEGED DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PAY PLAINTIFFS-FREELANCERS SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS (FIRST DEPT). ​
SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
SIX MONTHS WITHIN WHICH TO RECOMMENCE AN ACTION IN STATE COURT AFTER DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT RUNS FROM THE DETERMINATION OF THE FEDERAL RECONSIDERATION MOTION, NOT FROM THE INITIAL FEDERAL DISMISSAL.
THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE STATED THAT THE CONTRACTOR FOR WHOM THE INJURED PLAINTIFF WORKED WOULD HOLD THE “OWNER’S AGENT” HARMLESS AND DID NOT MENTION THE PROPERTY OWNER; THE CONTRACT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S INDEMNIFICATION ACTION AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Question of Fact Whether Defendant’s Negligence Precluded Her Reliance on the Doctrine of Mutual Mistake to Rescind a Valid Oral Contract
THE JUROR’S SIMULATION OF THE STABBING IN THE JURY ROOM DID NOT CONSTITUTE JUROR MISCONDUCT (FIRST DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED TO THE NYC BOARD OF STANDARDS AND APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS ZONING RESOLUTION WHICH ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 55 STORY CONDOMINIUM BUILDING; THE BUILDING IS COMPLETE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS APPLIES TO PRECLUDE THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LEASE TERMS ALLOWED JURY TO BE INSTRUCTED ON TENANT’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY... CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT...