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SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined a worksite “safety consultant” (PSS) did not exercise sufficient supervisory control to be held liable under the Labor Law. Plaintiff was injured when he fell through a plywood covered hole in a ramp. The decision has detailed recitations of the black letter law requirements for Labor law 240(1), 241 (6) and 200 causes of action:

PSS submitted evidence demonstrating that its role at the work site was only one of general supervision, and that it did not have the authority to control the work performed or the safety precautions taken by the general contractor and the plaintiff’s employer, which is insufficient to impose liability on a safety consultant under the Labor Law … .

“To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to exercise supervision and control over the work'” … . ” A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed'” … . ” [T]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor’s work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence'” … . Where a plaintiff’s injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a contractor may be liable under Labor Law § 200 ” only if it had control over the work site and either created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it'” … . Moreover, an entity is not deemed to be an agent of an owner or contractor for purposes of Labor Law § 200 if it “lacked sufficient control over the premises and the activity that brought about the injury” … . Marquez v L & M Dev. Partners, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 05631, 2nnd Dept 7-27-16

 

LABOR LAW (SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/SAFETY CONSULTANT (LABOR LAW, (SAFETY CONSULTANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER WORKSITE TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) OR 200–CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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