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EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED; NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) although the finding that petitioner had violated work-related requirements under the family assistance program was reversed and the reduction in petitioner's benefits had been restored, the appeal was not moot; (2) the wording of the notices of required meetings for work-assessment under the family assistance program did not violate the Social Services Law; and (3) the propriety of the “autopost” system by which petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled meeting resulted in an automatically posted infraction must be determined in the context of a summary judgment or a trial (not this declaratory judgment action). The dissenters argued the appeal was moot and should not have been heard:

… [W]e find that the notices at issue do not violate the applicable regulatory scheme. In reviewing these notices, we are mindful that “[t]he standard for judicial review of an administrative regulation is whether the regulation has a rational basis and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” … , or contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated … . The party challenging a regulation has the heavy burden of establishing that “it is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary” … . * * *

The regulation and notices closely track the statute, which focuses on how a recipient can demonstrate good cause for having failed to comply with work requirements. In fact, every requirement set forth in SSL § 341 is incorporated into the notices. The crux of Supreme Court's holding is that the regulation and notices do not satisfy a requirement that recipients be expressly told that they can avoid sanction by asserting compliance. The statute on its face, however, simply contains no such requirement. This is particularly true for the notice of decision, because SSL § 341(1)(b) does not require that the notice give examples of good cause. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot find that 18 NYCRR 385.11 and the notices were unreasonable or arbitrary. Matter of Puerto v Doar, 2016 NY Slip Op 04463, 1st Dept 6-9-16

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)/FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (NYC) (NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)/APPEALS (EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED; NOTICES OF MANDATORY MEETINGS REGARDING WORK-REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DID NOT VIOLATE THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW)

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