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ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined that the state, although the title owner of the property (Pier 40) where plaintiff was injured by a falling beam, was not subject to absolute liability under the Labor Law. Under the Hudson River Park Act, the day to day operation and management of Pier 40 was transferred to a public benefit corporation, the Hudson River Park Trust. The court was careful to note that leasing property does not relieve the owner of Labor Law liability. However, the terms of the Hudson River Park Act indicated the legislature's intent transfer Labor Law liability to the trust:

Section 5 of the Hudson River Park Act (Uncons Laws § 1645[1]), gives the Trust total “authority over the planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of” the park; the Act also gives the Trust the right to receive rents and other revenues generated from the park (see §§ 1646[g], 1647[10]), although ownership and title would remain with the State (see § 1647[2], [3]). Also, notably, the Act directs that the Trust has the capacity to sue and be sued (§ 1647[1][d][v]), and requires that all tort actions commenced against the Trust comply with the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (§ 1651). Most importantly, the Act expressly states that “[u]pon the coming into existence of the trust, the trust shall succeed to all contracts, leases, licenses and other legal obligations respecting the park to which its predecessors are a party at or after the effective date of this act” (§ 1645 [1] [emphasis added]). The legislature's use of the term “succeed to” and its reference to all “other legal obligations” of its predecessors clearly reflects an intent to have the Trust take over all legal liability arising out of ownership of the Park's premises. Costa v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 04119, 1st Dept 5-26-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST)/HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST (LABOR LAW, ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS THE TITLE OWNER OF PIER 40 ON THE HUDSON RIVER, THE HUDSON RIVER PARK ACT TRANSFERRED LABOR LAW ABSOLUTE LIABILITY TO THE HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST)

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