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AFTER MAKING A FINAL AWARD, THE RABBINICAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY MAKING A SECOND AWARD BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE.

The Second Department determined the arbitration award made by the rabbinical court was properly vacated. After making a final award, the rabbinical court, based on new information, made a second award:

“An arbitration award may not be vacated unless it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power” … . After an arbitrator renders an award, he or she is generally without power to render a new award or to modify the original award … . Here, because the arbitration award dated May 5, 2011, was final and definite within the meaning of CPLR 7511 … , the rabbinical court exceeded its authority in modifying the original award by rendering the new arbitration award dated July 22, 2013… . Matter of Pinkesz v Wertzberger, 2016 NY Slip Op 04060, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

ARBITRATION (AFTER MAKING A FINAL AWARD, THE RABBINICAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY MAKING A SECOND AWARD BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)/RABBINICAL COURT (AFTER MAKING A FINAL AWARD, THE RABBINICAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY MAKING A SECOND AWARD BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)

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