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DEFENDANT, WHICH INSTALLED CHRISTMAS DISPLAYS AT A MALL, DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF STEMMING FROM ITS CONTRACT WITH THE MALL; SINCE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ONLY ONE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO SUPPORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ADDRESS THAT ONE EXCEPTION IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant American Christmas did not owe a duty to plaintiff in this trip and fall case. American Christmas contracted with a shopping mall to install Christmas displays. After the installation contract was completed, plaintiff allegedly tripped over electrical wires taped to the floor. There was evidence American Christmas put up stanchions to prevent people from crossing over the cords. Plaintiff alleged American Christmas was liable in tort arising from the contract with the mall because it launched an instrument of harm. The court noted that because plaintiff only alleged one of the three possible criteria for liability to third persons arising from a contract, the defendant was only required to address that single theory in its motion for summary judgment:

Here, American Christmas demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by offering proof that the plaintiff was not a party to its holiday display contracts with the Mall Owner, and that it thus owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. American Christmas also established, prima facie, that the one Espinal exception alleged by the plaintiff that would give rise to a duty of care does not apply in this case (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d at 141-142). …

Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not allege facts that would establish the possible applicability of the second or third [Espinal] exception, American Christmas was not required to affirmatively demonstrate that these exceptions did not apply in order to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . Parrinello v Walt Whitman Mall, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 03481, 2nd Dept 3-4-16

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT, WHICH INSTALLED CHRISTMAS DISPLAYS AT A MALL, DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF STEMMING FROM ITS CONTRACT WITH MALL; SINCE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ONLY ONE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO SUPPORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ADDRESS THAT ONE EXCEPTION IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/CONTRACT LAW (DEFENDANT, WHICH INSTALLED CHRISTMAS DISPLAYS AT A MALL, DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF STEMMING FROM ITS CONTRACT WITH MALL; SINCE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ONLY ONE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO SUPPORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ADDRESS THAT ONE EXCEPTION IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANT, WHICH INSTALLED CHRISTMAS DISPLAYS AT A MALL, DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF STEMMING FROM ITS CONTRACT WITH MALL; SINCE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ONLY ONE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO SUPPORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ADDRESS THAT ONE EXCEPTION IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/ESPINAL EXCEPTIONS (DEFENDANT, WHICH INSTALLED CHRISTMAS DISPLAYS AT A MALL, DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF STEMMING FROM ITS CONTRACT WITH MALL; SINCE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ONLY ONE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO SUPPORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ADDRESS THAT ONE EXCEPTION IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

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TOWN BOARD MEMBERS AND TOWN OFFICIAL IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER 42 USC 1983. PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF STEPPING IN A HOLE ON THE PLAYING FIELD.